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Abstract:
From 1993 to 1998, Lesotho was governed without an official 
opposition in parliament. This situation destabilised the coun try’s 
fragile  democracy. The paper speculates that the country's 
stability, public policies and development program m es suffered  
adversely because o f  the problem  o f  one dominant party governing  
alone. A t the same time, the electoral system in Lesotho at the time 
was not able to reward losing parties, which gained less than 37  
per cent o f  electoral support fo r  opposition to be represented in 
parliament. Consequently, opposition parties engaged in concerted  
efforts to unseat the ruling party. Their efforts culminated in the 
unconstitutional removal o f  elected government by the K ing in 
1994 and the incessant political instability in 1998, which led to 
the com bined South African and Botswana military intervention in 
the country. The lack o f  opposition also prom pted factionalism
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within the ruling party, ending with its fragmentation and the birth 
o f  LCD, which won the 1998 elections. Furthermore, the lack o f  
opposition in parliam ent resulted in public policies not being 
adequately debated as the ruling party in 1993 and 1998 enjoyed  
concurrence from  its members in parliament.
Introduction
Democratisation has been a major influence in Sub-Saharan Africa 
towards the end o f the 1980s and early 1990s. According to Larrv 
Diamond (1995), what triggered this impetus was the demise o f its 
historical rivals; fascism was virtually destroyed after second world 
war, the appeals o f Marxism Leninism withered and experienced 
glaring economic failures, while military regimes lacked any 
ideological justification and legitimacy to govern as majority o f 
citizens and international community pressed for formal guarantees 
o f political and civil rights (Potter 1997).
Lesotho could not resist these winds o f change. 
Democratisation became inevitable, the military junta in Lesotho, 
though opposed to winds o f change, had to submit to these forces. 
In 1993, Lesotho became a democratic country, after free and fair 
competitive elections were held. The election was, however, to 
usher in a period o f uncertainty as the results failed to produce an 
official opposition in the 60-member parliament. Therefore, the 
“official opposition and formal opposition” terms will be used 
interchangeably to mean one and the same thing. It was this deficit 
within Lesotho political system that created instability within the 
Kingdom to date.
This paper analyses the 1993 and 1998 elections. By drawing 
on different democratic approaches the paper attempts to explain 
why these elections failed to produce an official opposition in 
parliament. Secondly, it discusses the relevance and importance o f 
official opposition in parliament. It also reveals the problems that 
were encountered in Lesotho as a direct consequence o f lack o f 
opposition in parliament. Finally, the paper provides the road map
as to what the Lesotho political elites should do in order to bring 
the situation to normality and promote democratic consolidation.
The 1993 and 1998 Elections
Finding itself under enormous international pressure to democratise 
the country, the military junta in Lesotho finally capitulated in 
1993. On the 27th March 1993, after a period o f nearly 23 years 
without democracy in the Kingdom, general elections were held. 
The Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) swept the elections, taking 
all 65 seats. This landslide denied the opposition parties even a 
single seat in parliament (Molomo 1999). The scale o f BCP victory 
was unprecedented in Lesotho history.
Shortly before 1998 elections, a new party, Lesotho Congress 
for Democracy (LCD) emerged from within the BCP. It was in this 
election (1998) that this party won 79 o f the 80 constituencies 
leaving one to the opposition. While the Basotho National Party 
managed, by shear luck, to hold on to one seat. The LCD won 60 
percent o f the popular vote while the opposition collectively polled 
40percent o f the vote Molomo (1999). The following table 
illustrates the scale o f opposition defeat from 1993 to 1999.
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Table l:Party Electoral Performance in 1993
Contestants No. of Votes % of Votes No. of Seats
BCP 398355 74.7 65
BNP 120686 22.6 0
MFP 7650 1.4 0
Other 6287 1.2 0
Total 532978 100 65
Party Electoral Performance in 1998
Contestants No. of Votes % of Votes No. of Seats
LCD 355049 60.7 79
BNP 143073 24.5 1
BCP 61793 10.6 0
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MFP 7460 1.3 0
Other 16244 2.9 0
Total 584740 100 80
Source: (Roger Southall, 1993, 1994, 1998)
What was remarkable about both 1993 and 1998 election results 
was the absence o f opposition in parliament. It was this situation 
that has characterised the current political system o f Lesotho. The 
electoral system performs one o f the most fundamental tasks in a 
representative democracy. For leaders to be elected, it is the 
electoral system that must play a crucial role o f translating 
individual votes into seats in parliament Lijphart (2000). Lesotho 
inherited Single-Member Simple Plurality (SMSP), system from 
Britain in 1966. SMSP traces its birth during the early 18th century 
Britain, before the establishment o f the universal franchise, the 
birth o f organised mass parties and pluralistic politics. It was 
during this period that the electoral system in operation in Lesotho 
was first used. In fact, when the system was introduced, it was then 
construed to have been;
appropriate fo r  the pre-democratic 
and pre-industrial era when the 
function o f  parliament was to vote 
monies to the crown in return fo r  
local privileges and patronage, and  
local coteries o f  landowners and  
merchants elected one or two o f  their 
own to protect and enhance their 
wealth (Crewe, 1993:93).
Under this system, according to Lijphart (2000), each voter cast 
one vote and the candidate who accumulates most votes is declared 
a winner. Therefore, under this system o f electing parliamentarians, 
each elector has only one vote; each constituency returns only one 
MP; and the candidate who has more votes than any other becomes 
the MP regardless o f whether he or she has more than 50 per cent 
o f the votes cast in the constituency (Dearlove, 200:456).
Supporters o f this system do not attempt to defend it on the 
grounds o f fairness but on the fact that it produces stable, 
responsible and moderate governments where MPs are closer to 
their constituents. While in some African countries, like Cameroon, 
Ghana and Nigeria, the electoral system has been able to produce 
opposition, in Lesotho the opposition has not been able to emerge 
through this system.
It is clear that electoral system does not meet popular expectations. 
Recent developments in Britain in 1997 indicated that, the system 
was modified. This was not the case in Lesotho during the above 
period. The country adopted the system in 1966 without even 
adapting it to suit the local conditions. In fact, the current signs 
indicate a shift in British perception in relation to the continuity o f 
the model in British polity. In 1999, United Kingdom used 
proportional electoral model for both the state, local and European 
parliament elections. These are some o f the strongest indications 
yet o f the case to reform the system.
Despite the above general feeling that the electoral system has 
not helped Lesotho, some authors present a contrary view. Sekatle 
(1999) for example argues that it was misleading for some political 
scientists to cry foul that, the above electoral system (SMSP) 
denied opposition parties representation in parliament. The author 
contends that parties were represented in 1965 and they would have 
been represented again in the 1970 elections, had the BNP not 
annulled the elections. The fact o f the matter is that, “the system 
rewards parties whose vote is concentrated locally and penalises 
parties whose support is evenly spread “(Crewe, 1993:93).
It would appear that BNP support is spread all over the country 
and therefore, the systems disadvantage against this party. The 
period o f  23 years has changed the political landscape beyond the 
confines o f SMSP. It does not follow that, because the parties were 
represented in 1965 and also that there were prospects o f 
representation in 1970 that the same situation will arise again after 
23yeas. May be if  we had elections during the period between 1970 
and 1993 we could have been forced to change the system. In fact
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SMSP is known to punish parties which obtain less than 37 percent 
o f the total vote cast (Crewe, 1993)
For Southall (1999), the voters delivered a heavy punishment 
upon BNP for its long term o f dictatorship. But, both these 
perceptions miss the crucial point as to why Lesotho electoral 
system, since 1993 has failed to produce an official opposition that 
might engender a fully representative system. Basotho continue to 
vote for BNP. In fact, BNP support base has increased as indicated 
in table 1 above. The followers continue to attend public gatherings 
o f this party. Why is it then, that, they persistently continue to do 
so if  they are punishing the party? Is it the electoral system which 
is doing more punishing or the electorate? I will argue that, it is not 
the electorate but the electoral system which appears to exclude 
most small parties in Lesotho. What is becoming evidently clear is 
that, parties in this country have not been able to mobilise much 
support that can be accommodated by the current electoral system 
because o f its exclusionary nature. Kadima (1999), arguing about 
the exclusiveness character o f this model, contends that;
while agreeing with Sekatle that B N P ’s 
confiscation o f  power in 1970 p layed  a 
part against it in i 993, I  nonetheless 
believe that an electoral system that 
ignores the choice o f  almost 40 percent 
o f  the electorate is not inclusive enough, 
and needs to be reformed to 
accommodate significant (members o f  
losing parties (Kadima, 1999,78).
He argues further that even the 1965 elections demonstrated 
exclusive patterns in that BNP won only 42 percent o f popular 
vote, but it was over rewarded by 50 percent seats while other 
parties collectively polled 58 percent o f votes and allocated only 48 
percent o f parliamentary seats.
When one looks at the above electoral results, one realises that, the 
system, since the post-war era, has thrown up bizarre anomalies. 
This included rewarding wrong winners and granting o f undue 
rewards as it did in 1951 when British Conservative party formed 
government after having won fewer votes than Labour, but more 
seats and, therefore, was able to govern Britain. In October, 1974, 
Labour won 39.2 per cent o f the popular vote but 50.2 per cent o f 
the seats (319 out o f the 635), and 1983, the Conservatives won 
42.4 per cent o f  the vote but 61.1 per cent o f the seats (397out o f 
650) in Britain (Crewe 1993). The system which has been alluded to 
favouring large parties has failed in Lesotho to translate BNP 
electoral results both in 1993 and 1998 into parliamentary seats, 
and thus, making a mockery o f Lesotho democracy. This has 
therefore, led to a country governed by one party, a feature which 
has created much political instability due to lack o f opposition in 
the country.
Democratic approaches
In our quest to trace and explain patterns o f democratisation in 
Lesotho, we need a set o f ideas and explanatory generalisation 
related to some theoretical approaches. Some authors suggest 
associated characteristics which must prevail before a country can 
be said to be democratic. These are economic in nature, such as 
high gross national product, equally high education levels within 
the country, rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, individualistic 
culture, and a high degree o f economic and social equality (Lipset 
(1959,1983), Healey (1994).
In explaining democratisation, Lipset (1960), adopts a 
modernisation approach. He argues that, democracy could be 
related to a country’s socio-economic development or level o f 
modernisation. W hile several variables are considered, the level o f 
development is critical. In fact, the more economically empowered 
people o f  the country are, on average, they are more likely to 
favour, achieve and maintain a democratic system o f their country. 
A country, which boosts a high level o f prosperity and economic
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growth, has a greater chance o f democratic sustainability Lipset 
(1960).
The transitional approach challenges the Lipset modernisation 
for its functional perspective instead o f asking how democracy 
comes into being in the first instance Rustow (1970). The 
propounders o f this approach argue that, a holistic consideration 
from different countries as case studies provides a viable analysis 
other than embarking on functional requisites. They argue that, the 
actions o f elites and their strategies during a country transition to 
democracy, is largely contingent on what they do when, how and 
where. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between initial 
democratic transition and democratic consolidation.
Conversely, the structural approach focuses on long-term 
processes ol historical change. I herefore, democracy is explained 
by changing structures o f power rather than by the agency o f 
political elites. The interrelationships o f certain structures o f power 
such as economics, social and political, as they gradually change 
through history dictates and drives political elites and others along 
a long path towards liberal democracy (Potter, 1997).
It would appear that, these approaches have been unable to shed 
a light on the unique character o f Lesotho political system, where 
there is no official opposition in parliament. 1 his deficit, however, 
does not invalidate the importance of opposition in any democratic 
dispensation. There are several reasons why opposition parties are 
needed in democracies. This is because “the indispensable role o f 
opposition parties in protecting the interests and rights o f  citizens, 
monitoring government, and consolidating dem ocracy” (Habib and 
Taylor, 2000: 52) cannot be overemphasised.
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The Relevance of Opposition to Stable Democracy
The absence o f official opposition means that national policies 
cannot be extensively debated. This system produces a parochial 
parliament whereby there is concurrence on all issues even where 
there are glaring problems because the side o f the opposition which 
does not exist in parliament cannot be known. Therefore, an 
opposition as a minority representative in parliament opposes the 
majority and presses for alternative solution, hence using influence 
to derive a viable compromise. It is generally agreed that a 
structured opposition is a viable and sustainable part o f a 
democratic polity. The absence o f opposition in Lesotho means 
that, the question o f checks and balances in parliament cannot be 
attained.
In the British political system, one minority party exercises the 
function o f  political opposition to the government, most 
importantly scrutinising government policies and providing 
alternative course o f direction. There is recognition o f the formal 
function o f opposition as highlighted by the ingenious notion o f 
His M ajesty’s Opposition and allowing opposition to the 
government while remaining loyal to the King. The opposition, 
therefore, becom es a shadow government, a measure that forces it 
to remain loyal to the King.
Political opposition, on the other hand, in the British political 
system and, above all, formal opposition remained a vividly salient 
notion o f British polity. Several authors insist that political 
opposition should not only be considered in the narrow framework 
of minority/majority relations but that set o f reference should 
include more core elements o f the political system whereby the 
political opposition have the main function o f representing the 
contingency o f the public domain. Neunreither (1998) argues that, 
the government presents a policy conjecture and the opposition 
demonstrates that you could arrive at different conclusion using the 
same data.
Neunreither submits further that, the main function o f the 
official opposition is to provide for an alternative within the
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system. In this discussion, official or formal opposition means a 
political party with less seats in parliament as opposed to the 
majority party, which governs the country with large number o f 
seats in the National Assembly.
While there are many definitions o f democracy, there is a 
consensus among scholars that “a democracy can almost be defined 
in terms o f the existence o f an effective opposition because without 
these opposition parties” (Shrire, 2000:27), democratic 
consolidation cannot be achieved. Habib and Taylor quoted Jun 
and Ian Shapiro (1995) who argued that opposition parties:
...facilitated a peaceful alteration in 
government. Parliamentary parties 
are perceived as institutional sites 
where ‘counter political elites... (can) 
organise and inform themselves so as 
to be able to contest fo r  pow er '(Ibid,
272). Should such institutional sites 
not exist, ‘crises fo r  the government 
are correspondingly more likely to 
become crises fo r  the democratic 
regime. (Ibid) ’ This then underlines 
their second argument, that a 
parliamentary opposition ensures that 
a citizenry's unhappiness with 
government is not automatically 
translated into a delegitimation o f  the 
democratic order (Habib Adam and  
Taylor Rupert., op cit,52.).
Opposition parties provide a viable institutional outlet for people 
who are unhappy with the government performance. It is through 
these institutions that government is kept in check. Therefore, 
opposition parties present a constant reminder to the government 
that if  its performance is not up to standard they would be removed 
from power come the next elections. By sustaining their attack on
the ruling party, enables the opposition parties to be perceived by 
prospective voters as a viable alternative to the ruling party.
Furthermore, it can be argued persuasively that “a viable 
parliamentary opposition facilitates institutional arrangem ents that 
enable the performance o f a variety o f public interest 
functions” (76/<7,52). In most cases, the opposition has an interest in 
keeping the government on its toes because this will make 
prospective voters see them as a better alternative to the 
government. By consistently engaging the government, the 
opposition parties are able to monitor and hold the government to 
account in a way that an ordinary citizen could not because they 
ask awkward questions both inside and outside parliament. They 
are also able to expose corrupt practices and excess o f government. 
The absence o f  opposition in the legislature is fraught with severe 
consequences for both sustainable democracy and the national 
stability. It is these problems that we now turn to.
The problems o f governing without official opposition
The dominance o f  BCP in parliament contributed to the rise o f 
party functionalism and the eventual break-up o f Basutoland 
Congress Party. Had there been an official opposition in Lesotho 
after 1993 election, events that led to the break-up o f BCP could 
have been avoided. Inevitably, factionalism, which afflicted the 
party with more vigour than before, prevailed. This situation was 
exacerbated by BCP winning all sixty-five (65) parliamentary 
seats. Therefore, a power struggle between the factions ensued in 
earnest at all levels o f the ruling party. (Pule; 1999).
The presence o f an opposition party could have, indeed, 
benefited the BCP because its members o f parliament were going 
to be forced to bury their differences and forged party unity and 
consensual decision-making. Convergence o f interests could have 
been promoted by a relative level o f party homogeneity w ithin the 
BCP parliamentarians. The parliamentary machinery was rendered 
moribund and ineffectual as power struggle between the party 
factions intensified. In one incidence regarding the election o f
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deputy speaker, on the 26th July 1996, the other faction staged a 
walkout in parliament claiming unparliamentary procedure was 
followed in selecting the Speaker o f parliament. They argued that, 
the matter should have been discussed by BCP parliamentarians 
prior to its implementation. This squabbling paralysed the national 
parliament dominated by one party. This chain o f events made a 
mockery o f the parliament. In fact, some o f the most important 
development programmes could not be debated properly because o f 
lack o f opposition in parliament. The Lesotho Highlands Water 
Development Fund was a glaring case in point.
What emerged, as a viable development scheme, from the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Development Fund, became a watershed 
for Lesotho politics. Initially, the World Bank had insisted that this 
fund should not interfere with the Bank austerity measures being 
implemented by the Lesotho government rather channelled directly 
into social development.
This fund became popularly known in both public and government 
circles as
“Fato-Fato” (Meaning; scratch-scratch without altering the 
surface). The whole programme was a fiasco as it failed to translate 
its objectives o f trickling down to the common man on the street 
into tangible and desirable results. It became a vehicle for 
parliamentary enrichment. The funds were completely 
misappropriated by parliamentarians. The situation deteriorated 
into an elaborate corruption patronage scheme designed to benefit 
the party faithful at constituency level. It would appear that 
members o f parliament who were afflicted by parliamentary 
parochialism appropriated these funds to cement their popularity at 
their rural base (Selinyane, 1996, Pule (1999).
The evidence o f blatant misappropriation by parliamentarian 
was presented succinctly by the then Finance M inister in his 
1996/97 Budget speech. He argued that:
there have been incidences o f  members 
o f  parliam ent being in possession o f  
fu n d  moneys an action specifically
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prohibited  under Finance Act, as fu n d  
resources are public funds and  
government is accountable to the public  
through parliament. Instances o f
M embers o f  Parliament becoming  
directly involved in decisions
concerning the implementation o f  
projects (Pule, 1999:15).
Despite the M inister’s protestations, it was still difficult to hold the 
parliament accountable, since in the nature o f things an official 
opposition that was lacking in parliament can assume this role. It is 
the function o f the opposition to hold the government in check and 
accountable for the above rampant misuse o f public funds. 
Unfortunately, in the case o f Lesotho political system, there was a 
great deficit in this direction. The elite corruption became too 
elaborate; knowing clearly that the opposition, which exists outside 
parliament, was powerless to force the government to account. 
Instead, the pattern that emerged was that this problem fuelled 
ammunition within the ruling party factions not to force another 
group to account but to demand more o f the cake themselves.
The problems o f governing without official opposition in 
Lesotho have ushered a new dimension, that o f government failure 
to present the nation with the balance sheet, which reflect how 
public monies have been used. This issue o f public expenditure 
remains shrouded in secrecy. This pattern created much concern 
within Lesotho political circles. It was nearly five years since the 
last audit report had been published. Since there was no opposition 
in the then parliament, there was nobody to press for the 
publication o f this crucial report that will inform the public about 
the current status o f government expenditures. In fact, what is even 
more alarming is that under the Constitution o f Lesotho, the 
Auditor-General (AG) is mandated to produce this report once a 
year. It goes further to argue that, AG shall ensure that all moneys 
disbursed by parliament are utilised for the purposes intended. 
Therefore, Section 117 (2) (b) states that:
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at least once in every year (AG) is to 
audit and report on the public accounts 
o f  the government o f  Lesotho, the 
accounts o f  all officers and authorities 
o f  that government, the accounts o f  all 
courts in Lesotho, the accounts o f  every 
Commission established by this 
Constitution and the accounts o f  the 
Clerk to each House o f  Parliament (the 
Constitution o f  Lesotho, 1993,104).
The complete disregard o f this Constitutional section is indicative 
o f how far governments governing without official opposition can 
go in defeating democratic principles o f transparency and 
accountability.
On the 22nd September 1994, the government o f Lesotho reached 
an agreement with the Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU). 
This agreement was in relation with the revision o f teacher’s 
salaries. The government compensation policy that was drawn after 
protracted negotiations with the teachers entails that teachers’ 
salaries would be reviewed and salary increment shall come to 
force from February 1995. However, the measure was implemented 
for only two months from February until March before a dramatic 
policy “U-turn “ by the government. According to Lentsoe La 
Basotho newspaper (1995), a parliamentary speech was made on 
the 12th March 1995, which reflected the agreement as a mistake 
and called for its immediate termination. Since there was no 
official opposition in parliament to pressure the government to 
account for this dramatic policy change, the government reneged 
on the agreement with LTTU unhindered. It proceeded freely to 
terminate this measure unilaterally without even engaging the 
concerned bodies. This undemocratic move, which was motivated 
by the absence o f opposition in parliament, was to unleash one o f 
the incessant and protracted strikes ever seen in the country. The 
government response was swift on the strikers. It announced a “no 
work no pay” policy against the striking teachers. The government
did not even explain their stance to the nation clearly. It just 
continued as if  nothing had happened.
Lesotho experienced unprecedented levels o f political 
instability immediately after 1993 election. For the first time in the 
political history o f Lesotho, the country witnessed a military 
uprising. This culminated into an open warfare between the two 
main army barracks based in Maseru Township at M akoanyane and 
Ha Ratjomose. It would appear that there was a simmering 
discontent within the Army, which the government was unable to 
ameliorate. Since there was no opposition in parliament, the 
government could not be held to account. There was no satisfactory 
explanation from the authorities relating to what was the real 
source o f the problem. Because o f the long period o f  authoritarian 
rule in Lesotho, civil society was still in its infancy, therefore, 
appeared very weak to tackle the government head on for its 
invasiveness relating to this military disturbance.
Political parties, which were not in parliament protested. They 
demanded, among others, that the King should intervene and 
dissolve the government. They presented their m emorandum at the 
Royal palace. The King immediately and unconstitutionally 
dissolved the government. This action unleashed incessant 
instability in Lesotho which motivated foreign intervention and led 
to the signing o f “ the 1994 M emorandum o f Agreement that 
reinstated the then BCP government after a temporary 
displacement by the King which was overseen by Botswana, South 
Africa and Zim babwe” (M atlosa, 1999; 189).
These problem s reached fever pitch after 1998 general election, 
which failed to produce an official opposition. The 1993 election 
was equally destabilising but the conflict that erupted in 1998 far 
surpassed ordinary M osotho expectations. The opposition parties 
were ostensibly crying foul about election returns. On the 4th 
august 1998, opposition political parties intensified their 
demonstrations and appealed to The King to intervene and disband 
the government, declare the elections null and void, and call for 
fresh elections under the auspices o f a government o f National 
Unity. The party that had won the election (LCD) in table 1 argued
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that the elections were free and fair. The International observers 
further reiterated these sentiments. They argued that the elections 
were characterised by demonstration o f freedom and fairness.
However, the fundamental problem was the conspicuous 
absence o f the opposition in parliament as reflected in table 1 
above. The situation was highly charged. Protesters camped at the 
palace gates, demanding The King’s intervention. This situation 
which was created by opposition parties, culminated in the 
complete breakdown o f the rule o f law. The government was 
paralysed as both the army and the police failed to dislodge the 
protesters from the palace grounds. A state o f anarchy ensued.
These events were terminated by South African Defence force 
intervention on the 22nd September 1998, which came to restore 
order on the invitation o f the government. Following the protracted 
crisis, the government governing without opposition reneged on the 
ongoing negotiations between political parties and defied all rules 
in Lesotho and requested external military intervention. Not even 
The King was notified about this unconstitutional move. In fact, the 
constitution o f Lesotho section 92 states thus:
The King shall have the right to he 
consulted by the Prime Minister and  
other Ministers on all matters relating 
to the government o f  Lesotho and the 
Prime Minister shall keep him fu lly  
informed concerning the general 
conduct o f  the government o f  Lesotho 
and shall furnish  him with such 
information as he may request in 
respect o f  any particular matter relating  
to the government o f  Lesotho "(The 
constitution o f  Lesotho, 1993,88).
Both the King and all parties outside parliament were not consulted 
about the intervention. This intervention according to M atlosa 
(1999), not only failed to establish its legal intention but failed to
meet the necessary statutes o f the UN charter, especially, chapter 
VI, VII and VIII. Furthermore, the intervention did not get the 
blessing o f  all protagonists, hence the reasons why the levels o f 
causalities became too high.
M atlosa (1999) argues further that the intervention did not even 
have a clear mandate from both the organisation o f African Unity 
(OAU) and SADC. In fact, even the 1994 guarantor status given to 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe did not even have a 
military intervention clause. These countries felt compelled by the 
on going lawlessness to intervene to restore law and order. The 
whole question was a further illustration o f dangerous prospects 
that any country will be confronted with when governed by one 
party without the official opposition and deciding on crucial 
national matters without informed debate from the other side. To 
ameliorate the situation, SADC provided a political settlement, 
which saw the establishment o f Independent Political Authority 
(IPA), composed o f  all registered parties, in the country to restrain 
the ruling party. The IPA disallowed the ruling party to have free 
reign over the preparation o f the next election. The IPA was 
mandated to perform the following tasks: to
prepare, in liaison with the legislative and executive 
organs o f  the state, fo r  a fresh  election in the year 2000, 
level the p laying fie ld  fo r  all parties and candidates to 
participate meaningfully in the election in an environment 
that prom otes and protects human rights, 
eliminate any impediment to legitimate political activity, 
including undue victimisation or intimidation; and  
ensure equal treatment o f  all political parties and  
candidates by all government-owned media, prior to and  
during the election (Matlosa, 1999; 190).
It was clear that no party can level the political field on its own, 
instead must work with other parties. It would appear that the 
establishment o f IPA under this political settlem ent was
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precipitated by direct result o f not having an official opposition in 
parliament.
The prospects for democratic consolidation in Lesotho
For democracy to be sustainable, all sides within the political 
system must have representation. This means that the loser’s voice 
must be entertained. This was not impossible to attain in Lesotho 
political system. What is required is the political will o f all role 
players to inculcate, nourish, entrench a culture o f tolerance and 
political accommodation. The must be a clear recognition by all 
political leaders that the ruling party and opposition parties need 
each other for nation-building and national unity. There is a strong 
base for this to take root. Lesotho is blessed with one homogeneous 
ethnic group. Unlike other ethnic-ridden countries in Africa, 
Lesotho problems could be solved with relative ease between the 
parties and thus creating the much-cherished Lesothoness. It is this 
potential which must be taped and positively directed through 
national dialogue to achieve the political stability which the 
country needs desperately.
In order to address the question o f democratic sustainability, 
the parties must recognise and accept that a win-win solution rather 
than zero-sum solutions are best for Lesotho’s future. They must 
adopt constructive resolution and management o f conflicts without 
recourse to violent confrontation by belligerent parties.
The rules o f the game should be clearly established. Politics is 
about contesting power. In the absence o f a long-standing 
constitutional tradition, rules and their application must be 
negotiated. It is imperative that the parties should adopt a broadly 
representative and inclusive electoral system that is able to accord 
the ruling party the needed legitimacy and opposition parties a 
recognisable political role in national affairs. The more people are 
excluded from their national affairs the more the country stability is 
affected.
The governance without official opposition is fraught with 
dangers. W hat Lesotho must seriously consider, is the adoption o f
proportional representation model. This system strives for a wider 
representation and limits any prospects for any political party to 
govern without opposition. The current efforts must be intensified 
which are geared towards the changing o f the current majoritarian 
system in order “to increase representation for non-winning parties 
and ultimately limit the incidence o f election-related 
conflicts”(Akokpari: 1998:77).
Conclusion
What is evident is that Lesotho has not derived dividends from the 
political system characterised by exclusionary practices. The 
electoral system has not been successful in ushering opposition 
party in parliament and promoting stability in Lesotho following 
the history o f  acrimony on its outcome since 1993. The system has 
become ineffectual to say the least. The British have modified the 
system and South Africa has adopted a more embracing electoral 
system why can’t Lesotho do the same? It is more prudent to 
jettison this situation and adopt a system that shall provide Basotho 
with Opposition in parliament and better proportional 
representation on national affairs.
What has become clear in Lesotho is that the absence o f  
opposition has presented the country with severe problems. These 
problems are mainly policy oriented. In fact, the fundamental 
ingredient o f democracy is the participation o f electorates in public 
policy through their representatives, this aspect is lacking and it has 
made a mockery o f  democracy in this country. As such, the 
government has forgotten to consult stakeholders in all aspects o f 
public policy. The A uditor’s report was not issued for some years 
to inform the nation about the current status o f government 
expenditure. This is another serious democratic deficit. It is clear 
that a country governed without opposition will always remain 
unstable and Lesotho is a case in point.
This will ameliorate the current situation whereby the 
government is having a free reign in national affairs w ithout having
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to debate crucial policies with the official opposition and thus 
rendering Lesotho infant democracy moribund. Therefore, there is 
a need to deepen and consolidate Lesotho’s democracy and 
political stability, in order to lay the foundations for development; 
and boosting o f Lesotho’s international image as a widely accepted 
beacon o f peace, stability and tolerance and thus a model for other 
war-torn societies to emulate.
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